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The Development Dilemma:
Reconciling U.S. Foreign Direct Investment in Latin
America with Laborers' Rights:
A Study of Mexico, The Dominican
Republic and Costa Rica
Juan Carlos Linares*
Carmen Vazquez, a woman who works at the Maxell plant in
Mexico, makes about 55 pesos a day.'
In order to buy a gallon of milk for her two kids she has to work
more than half a day. It is really difficult for her to feed her
family on the wages she is earning. She takes two buses to work
and two buses to get home. It costs five pesos each way - that
means that she works almost half a day just to get the money to
get to work and back. Her solution to this problem, the solution
of her family, is that her two kids went to work in the factories
when they were 14 and 15 years old. Her youngest one says
"[t]here's really no future for me here; I think eventually what
I'm going to do is I'm going to go and try to cross the border
and get a job in the United States. ' 2
Carmen Vazquez and her family exemplify the difficulties
faced by millions of workers in developing nations, particularly in
Latin America, who attempt to carve out a living from labor in
American-owned factories. For decades, the interests of these
workers have remained underrepresented,3 allowing labor and
* Attorney/Consultant, Deloitte & Touche LLP, Chicago; B.A., University of Illinois;
J.D., Depaul University College of Law; LL.M. candidate, The John Marshall Law
School. This article does not reflect the views of Deloitte & Touche LLP. Thanks to
Monica Torres, Esq. and Prof. Michael Avramovich for their encouragement in writing
this paper. Also thanks to the staff at the North Carolina Journal of International Law
and Commercial Regulation for their editorial support.
I Symposium, Workers, Profits and Trade: The Benefits and Burdens of
Maquiladoras, 23 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 45 (2000) [hereinafter Workers, Profits, and
Trade].
2 Id. at 51.
3 Susanna Peters, Labor Law for the Maquiladoras: Choosing Between
Workers'Rights and Foreign Investment, 11 CoMP. LAB. L.J. 226, 240 (1990).
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human rights abuses to run rampant. Yet, U.S. foreign direct
investment (FDI) into the region has had an undeniably positive
effect on Latin American economies, which endeavor to stay
competitive globally, especially during the current economic
slump experienced worldwide. Reconciling workers' rights with
FDI is indeed a daunting task that must be addressed if U.S.-Latin
American economic ties are to continue cordially and
productively.
Part I of this paper introduces FDI from the United States into
Latin America, and the maquiladora as its labor vehicle. Part II
outlines modem theories of economic advantage, which have laid
the foundation for international policy and FDI. Part III illustrates
the experiences of Latin American nations via Mexico, the
Dominican Republic, and Costa Rica, each utilizing different
strategies in attracting and retaining FDI. Part IV of this paper
draws upon the treatment of workers in maquiladoras and export
processing zones (EPZs), the labor standards imposed upon those
areas, and the enforcement mechanisms that are in place. Part V
summarizes the benefits and burdens of FDI into Latin American
industrial enclaves by applying economic theory, forecasting
future investment into Latin America, and posing a solution to the
reconciliation problem.
I. Introduction
Currently, countries that account for 70% of the world
populations receive less than 10% of the world's trade and
investment, with the least developed countries composed of 10%
of the population receiving less than 2%.' Without a doubt,
foreign investment is imperative for the economic advancement of
developing nations, particularly in Latin America.
Undercapitalized nations, especially those with limited economic
infrastructure, "can piggyback on the wide distribution of skills,
knowledge, communications systems and capital" that result from
investment from around the world.5 A common strategy of these
4 Michael H. Davis & Dana Neacsu, Legitimacy, Globally: The Incoherence of
Free Trade Practice, Global Economics and Their Governing Principles of Political
Economy, 69 UMKC L. REV. 733, 784 (2001).




nations in attracting foreign investors has been to establish,
promote, and maintain low-wage export industries for use by
foreign, and especially U.S., industrial interests.6 This strategy has
spawned the growth of the EPZ and the maquiladora,7 unique
manufacturing sectors that cater to and support the low-cost
objectives of foreign investors.8
Fundamentally, the purpose of establishing EPZs and
maquiladoras was to "provide foreign investors and their
subcontractors with freedom from duties on the capital equipment
and components used in assembly operation, to enable them to
operate with modem infrastructure, and to offer them sanctuary
from the adverse business conditions (red tape, corruption, delays)
evident in other parts of [Latin American] economies."'9 "Enclave
enterprises" have developed from these EPZs, where labor
communities have unfolded on regional scales."0 That is, job
seekers have formed "special reserve pool[s] of unskilled labor
from which they can be pulled at any time to fulfill specific
requirements of international capital."'" Consequently, countless
workers have uprooted themselves from their familial territories,
only to find themselves unexpectedly as permanent fixtures in
overcrowded and overrun industrial sites, living and working in
squalid conditions.
As a result of these conditions, labor rights proponents have
attacked maquiladoras and EPZs, labeling many as sweatshops. 2
6 THEODORE H. MORAN, BEYOND SWEATSHOPS: FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND
GLOBALIZATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 17 (2002).
7 See generally http://www.dictionary.com (last visited Nov. 2, 2003) (defining
the maquiladora as an "assembly plant in Mexico, especially one along the border
between the United States and Mexico, to which foreign materials and parts are shipped
and from which the finished product is returned to the original market.").
8 See Aureliano Gonzalez Baz, Manufacturing In Mexico: The Mexican In-Bond
(Maquila) Program, at http://www.udel.edu/leipzig/texts2/voxl28.htm (last modified
June 3, 1996) (providing a general background for maquiladoras).
9 See MORAN, supra note 6, at 17.
10 See Maria L. Ontiveros, A Vision of Global Capitalism That Puts Women and
People of Color at the Center, 3 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 27, 34 (1999).
I1 Id. (quoting Cecilia Green, At the Junction of the Global and the Local:
Transnational Industry and Women Workers in the Caribbean, in HUMAN RIGHTS,
LABOR RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 118 (Lance A. Compa & Stephen F.
Diamond eds., 1996)).
12 Sheryl Dickey, The Free Trade Area of the Americas and Human Rights
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Partially blamed are governments of target FDI nations, which
have been "pressured to lower or maintain low labor standards to
attract and keep foreign direct investment."13  Undoubtedly,
"conditions in these foreign-owned and subcontractor plants have
offered extensive evidence of harm, and of the exploitation and
abuse of workers." 4  "Surveys by the International Labor
Organization (ILO), on the other hand, have regularly found that
the pay for workers in maquiladoras, while extremely low by the
standards of developed countries, is higher than what would be
available in the villages from which the workers come."' 5 The
premise of this piece is that adherence to recognized labor rights
and standards are inevitably essential to the attraction and
maintenance of FDI and, in turn, the economic well-being of both
the United States and its Latin American neighbors. Accordingly,
observance of workers' rights is "a floor below which production
should be considered illegitimate."' 6
II. Economic Theories of Foreign Direct Investment
"Understanding the economic theory behind trade policy is an
important tool" for understanding the trade and investment
agreements undertaken by the United States and Latin American
nations. 7 Over two centuries ago, "[1]iberal economic theorists,
particularly Adam Smith and David Ricardo, sought to
demonstrate that free markets unfettered by state regulation would
result in the greatest prosperity for all."' 8 These theories were, in
Concerns, 8 No. 3 HuM. RTS. BRIEF 26, 26 (2001) (defining sweatshops as "workplaces
with exploitative conditions, including hazardous working conditions, lack of a living
wage, denial of basic benefits, and intimidation and violence directed towards workers
advocating for independent unions.").
13 Id.
14 MORAN, supra note 6, at 11.
15 Id. at 13.
16 Adelle Blackett, Whither Social Clause? Human Rights, Trade Theory and
Treaty Interpretation, 31 COLUM. HuM. RTS. L. REv. 1, 32 (1999); see also MORAN,
supra note 6, at 7 (explaining that countries are best served when they adopt a "build-up"
approach rather than a "trickle-down" approach to capturing the benefits of foreign direct
investment.").
17 Jeffrey Simser, GATS and Financial Services: Redefining Borders, 3 BUFF. J.
INT'L L. 33, 41 (1996).
18 Davis & Neacsu, supra note 4, at 758 (quoting Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The
Political Economy of a Bilateral Investment Treaty, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 621, 623 (1998)).
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time, modified and adjusted to take into account advances in
technology and international trade agreements.
A. Adam Smith - Absolute Advantage Theory
Adam Smith revolutionized economic theory in the late 1700s.
Prior to his notable publications, the economies of the Western
World adhered to the theories of mercantilism. "[M]ercantilist
theory held that trade was a kind of sum-zero game in which the
country with the greatest absolute advantage was able to profit at
the expense of less advantageous ones."' 9 Favorable balances of
trade were viewed as essential for domestic reasons and were
inextricably tied to national security issues. 20 "Exports represented
a net profit while imports were a failure and a net loss.21
Accordingly, "measures to increase exports were valuable while
tariffs to prevent imports were desirable. 22
"Adam Smith challenged the premises of Mercantilism,
arguing that the goal of a nation was not to accumulate precious
metals, but rather to satisfy the consumer needs of citizens. 23 He
wrote:
The two principles being established, however, that wealth
consisted in gold and silver, and that those metals could be
brought into a country which had no mines only by the balance
of trade, or by exporting to a greater value than it imported; it
necessarily became the great object of political economy to
diminish as much as possible the importation of foreign goods
for home-consumption, and to increase as much as possible the
exportation of the produce of domestic industry. Its two great
engines for enriching the country, therefore, were restraints upon
24importation, and encouragements to exportation.
Smith further criticized mercantilist theory in that "trade amongst
19 Id. at 753; see also Simser, supra note 17, at 41 (defining the sum-zero game as
"the gain of country A" coming "invariably at the expense of country B.").
20 See Gerald A. Bunting, GATT and the Evolution of the Global Trade System: A
Historical Perspective, 11 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 505, 507 (1996).
21 Davis & Neacsu, supra note 4, at 753.
22 Id.
23 Simser, supra note 17, at 41.
24 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 286 (Kathryn Sutherland ed., World's Classics 1993) (1776).
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nations was not a sum-zero enterprise but rather an evolving
source of wealth from which the most competitive will reap the
greatest reward. 25
B. David Ricardo - Comparative Advantage Theory
David Ricardo recognized, but refined Smith's notion of
absolute advantage. According to Ricardo, absolute advantages
were unnecessary in the overall context of trade between two
nations as long as each country could profit by trading with the
other, even assuming one country could theoretically produce all
of the traded goods more efficiently.26 Essentially, states should
"trade those goods that they can produce comparatively more
cheaply than can other states, and that comparative advantage
stems from differences in factor prices."27 Ricardo believed that:
Though that one country might have absolute advantages, it
behooves it to engage in those traded goods (or services, today)
in which it has a comparatively greater advantage, and purchase
the remaining goods from its partner(s), who profit by those
exports and purchase goods (or services) from the first at a
lower price than they could producing for themselves. Thus,
each country will invest in that over which it has a greater
comparative, not absolute, advantage making a greater profit
from its partner(s) than if it supplied itself, with each country
profiting to the extent of its comparative advantages.
28
Ricardo aptly illustrated that each nation should export items
that can be produced efficiently and import everything else. 29 His
law of comparative advantage concluded that "all nations, not just
the richest or most powerful, can profit from unhindered
international trade, since each country can exploit and thus profit
from its own particular advantages, even while it pays others for
goods produced elsewhere."30 "Even if the home country could
25 Simser, supra note 17, at 41.
26 Davis & Neacsu, supra note 4, at 753.
27 Cheryl W. Gray & William W. Jarosz, Law and the Regulation of Foreign Direct
Investment: The Experience from Central and Eastern Europe, 33 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 9 (1995).
28 Davis & Neacsu, supra note 4, at 753-54.
29 Simser, supra note 17, at 42-43.
30 Davis & Neacsu, supra note 4, at 733; see also Paul R. McDaniel, The Pursuit of
National Tax Policies in a Globalized Environment: Trade and Taxation, 26 BROOK. J.
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produce everything more cheaply than the foreign, it is better to
concentrate on those industries that yield the highest profit rate,
exporting them and purchasing foreign goods, even if at a
somewhat higher price than they could be otherwise purchased at
home."'" Comparative advantage, however, rests on the
proposition that countries like those in Latin America "differ in
their ability to produce particular goods or provide needed
,,31services.
C. The Heckscher-Ohlin Model
Eli Heckscher 33 and Bertil Ohlin,34 two Swedish economists,
modernized Ricardo's theory, "explaining that in addition to
simple comparative advantage, countries will exploit their most
abundant resources even if it violates basic comparative
INT'L L. 1621, 1625 (2001) (advancing Ricardo's notion that the "welfare of residents of
all countries is enhanced if they can purchase goods and services at their lowest prices on
the world market. A nation need not be absolutely more efficient than another in order
to benefit by trading with the other.").
31 Davis & Neacsu, supra note 4, at 753; see also DAVID RICARDO, ON THE
PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION (1819), microformed on No. 49280
(Early American Imprints). Two of Ricardo's famous paragraphs are particularly
relevant:
England may be so circumstanced, that to produce the cloth may require the
labour of 100 men for one year; and if she attempted to make the wine, it might
require the labour of 120 men for the same time. England would therefore find
it her interest to import wine, and to purchase it by the exportation of cloth.
To produce the wine in Portugal, might require only the labour of eighty men
for one year, and to produce the cloth in the same country, might require the
labour of ninety men for the same time. It would therefore be advantageous for
her to export wine in exchange for cloth. This exchange might even take place,
notwithstanding that the commodity imported by Portugal could be produced
there with less labour than in England. Though she could make the cloth with
the labor of ninety men, she would import it from a country where it required
the labour of 100 men to produce it because it would be advantageous to her
rather to employ her capital in the production of wine, for which she would
obtain more cloth from England, than she could produce by diverting a portion
of her capital from the cultivation of vines to the manufacture of cloth.
Id.
32 McDaniel, supra note 30, at 1625.
33 Eli Heckscher, The Effect of Foreign Trade on the Distribution of Income, in
READINGS IN THE THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 272 (Howard H. Ellis et al. eds.,
Blakiston Co. 1950).
34 BERTIL OHLIN, INTERREGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE (rev. ed. 1967).
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advantage."35 The Heckscher-Ohlin theorem, also known as the
factor endowment approach, modified comparative advantage to
account for the fact that a nation may still produce a product in
which it does not have an advantage.36 In essence, "nations with
an abundance of capital will have a comparative advantage in
capital intensive industries, while nations with an abundance of
labor will have a comparative advantage in labor intensive
production."37
Under a two-pronged analysis, the Heckscher-Ohlin model
theorizes that (1) commodities differ in factor requirements; and
(2) countries differ in factor requirements. Here, countries have a
comparative advantage in using abundant factors intensively.
Thus, countries with abundant capital will engage in capital-
intensive industries and labor-rich countries will engage in labor-
intensive activities. Nations, including those of Latin America,
have indeed benefited economically by respecting the wisdom of
the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem.
III. Foreign Direct Investment
In general, the advantage of FDI is the generation of
significant resource flows to the country and improvement of its
exports, employment, and income situations, while not adding to a
country's debt.38
35 Davis & Neacsu, supra note 4, at 755-56 (explaining that "comparative
advantage did not explain why even advanced economies frequently engaged in
activities that might be more efficiently performed by others.... It, like laissez faire
capitalism, has been roundly criticized and often rejected by modem economic theory,"
which notes that the term comparative advantage has been used by economists in
different and often incongruent ways).
36 See Simser, supra note 17, at 42.
37 Id. at 42-43; see also Anthony Scaperlanda, Trade in the 1990's: Is an
International Organization for Multinational Enterprises Needed?, 14 N. ILL. U. L. REV.
421, 422 (1994) (discussing that the explicit assumption underlying all trade theory is
that factors of production, including FDI, do not move internationally).
38 Michael Comell Dypski, The Caribbean Basin Initiative: An Examination of
Structural Dependency, Good Neighbor Relations, and American Investment, 12 J.
TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 95, 115 (2002); see also 15 C.F.R. § 806.15(a)(1) (2003)
(defining foreign direct investment in the United States as "the ownership or control,
directly or indirectly, by one foreign person of 10 per centum or more of the voting
securities of an incorporated U.S. business enterprise or an equivalent interest in an
unincorporated U.S. business enterprise, including a branch.").
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As of 1991, the United States accounted for approximately
25% of the world's total FDI share, with Western Europe as a
region accounting for over 50% and Japan for 12.6%. 39 United
States firms have, however, contributed much of the capital
invested in Latin America and its maquiladora communities.
Three nations in particular - Mexico, the Dominican Republic,
and Costa Rica - portray varied experiences in attaining FDI and
maintaining workforces of assorted skill levels.
A. Mexico
"No country in the world has a greater impact on the daily life
of Americans than does Mexico." '4 An important trading partner,
Mexico receives approximately 75% of its imports from the
United States and directs approximately 85% of its exports there.'
Investment of the U.S. dollar from across the border is key to
industrial growth and development in Mexico." For several years,
Mexico has focused on the maquiladora industry as the main
source of drawing dollars into its economy.43 In fact, the
maquiladora industry is the only sector with sustained economic
growth throughout the 1990s, with $3.6 billion invested from
1998-2000 in Mexico. 4
Historically, the Mexican government held fast to a strict
protectionist economic policy as the ruling party, the Institutional
Revolutionary Party (PRI), sought to solidify its grasp of the
Mexican economy.45 During the 1980s, however, comprehensive
trade reform led to the opening of Mexico's borders to foreign
trade and investment.46 In fact, most, if not all, of the FDI in
Mexico is due to the Mexican government's unilateral
39 Scaperlanda, supra note 37, at 424 (1994).
40 Hale E. Sheppard, Salvaging Trade and Political Relations with Mexico in the
Aftermath of the Terrorist Attacks: A Call for a Reevaluation of U.S. Law and Policy, 20
B.U. INT'L L.J. 33 (2002) (quoting the U.S. ambassador to Mexico).
41 Id. at 34.
42 Workers, Profits, and Trade, supra note 1, at 48.
43 Id. at 48-49.
44 Id. at 49.
45 See Gordon H. Hanson & Ann Harrison, Trade Liberalization and Wage
Inequality in Mexico, 52 INDus. & LAB. REL. REV. 271, 274-75 (1999).
46 Id. at 275.
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determinations in the late 1980s "to liberalize and open the
economy, and to abandon its earlier protectionist policy."47 The
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was a
confirmation of this change within Mexico, "not the cause of it."48
Consequently, the Mexican government removed many barriers to
foreign investment.4 9 Among the notable ones were "limits on the
foreign share of equity ownership in a Mexican firm and
requirements that foreign firms obtain government approval for
technology transfer from abroad and other activities."" "Many of
these economic modifications were codified in 1989."'5
As a result of economic modifications made in the late 1980s,
an influx of FDI into the Mexican maquiladora industry soon
followed. Up until the 1990s, the majority of the maquiladoras
were along the border with the United States.52 Now, only 67% of
maquiladoras are in the border regions, reflecting a positive
change as problems including high turnover and a lack of
technically skilled people have traditionally been common in that
region. 3 The remainder of maquiladoras are scattered within the
nation's interior, employing a growing number of technically
skilled people from the respective state. 4
In 1993, a monumental step in the direction of Mexican
economic growth occurred when Mexico, Canada, and the United
States signed NAFTA.55 In ratifying the document, the three
nations intended to "promote economic development by
eliminating obstacles to free trade in goods, capital and services"
among them. 6 Soon afterwards, over a million Mexicans were at
47 See Christopher L. Erickson and Daniel J.B. Mitchell, The American Experience
with Labor Standards and Trade Agreements, 3 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 41, 62
(1999).
48 Id.
49 Hanson & Harrison, supra note 45, at 275.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 275.
52 Workers, Profits, and Trade, supra note 1, at 49.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32
I.L.M. 289 (effective Jan. 1, 1994) [hereinafter NAFTA].
56 John P. Isa, Testing the NAALC's Dispute Resolution System: A Case Study, 7
AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 179, 182 (1999).
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work in newly constructed, American-owned maquiladoras in the
northern industrial border region.57
Under the tariff-free protections of NAFTA, multinational
corporations have sent the assembly work across the border for
process and completion in Mexico's low wage areas.58 People in
Mexico, who are far less skilled than workers in the United States,
Europe, or Japan, perform this assembly work. 9 In supply terms,
less than 2% of component parts that are utilized in the final
products, and re-exported out of Mexico, are generated in
Mexico. 60  "That means that there are very few suppliers in
Mexico that are involved in this industry, and therefore, it has
been classified more or less, informally, as an 'enclave
economy.'61
In spite of these labor-saturated enclaves, FDI has indeed
diversified the Mexican economy.62 Industries ranging from
textile producers to technology magnates like General Electric
have sent vast amounts of investment capital into Mexico to take
advantage of NAFTA and the seemingly unlimited supply of
maquiladora labor. In recent years, FDI has also led to the
increase in Mexican per capita income from $8,838 in 1980 to
$9,532 in 2000.63 Opponents of NAFTA and U.S. FDI in Mexico,
however, point out that the increase in income and wages has not
been equally distributed among the Mexican populace.64
B. The Dominican Republic
The Dominican Republic is a representative Caribbean nation
57 Dickey, supra note 12, at 27.
58 See Workers, Profits, and Trade, supra note 1, at 45.
59 See id.
60 Id. at 47. (explaining that "[i]n the manufacturing process, there are at least five
identifiable stages: (1) research and development, (2) manufacturing and component
parts, (3) assembly, (4) testing, and (5) distribution to the final end user.").
61 Id.
62 Isa, supra note 56, at 197.
63 See SURJIT S. BHALLA, INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS, IMAGINE
THERE'S No COUNTRY: POVERTY, INEQUALITY, AND GROWTH IN THE ERA OF
GLOBALIZATION 221 (2002).
64 See Hanson & Harrison, supra note 45, at 276 (demonstrating that "between
1984 and 1990, average real hourly wages for white-collar workers increased by 13.4%,
while those for blue collar workers decreased by 14%.").
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with a largely unskilled labor pool that in recent years has
spawned intense FDI. Historically, the Dominican Republic, like
most Latin American nations, followed the Structural Dependency
Theory.65 Under this theory, nations of Latin America and the
Caribbean, including the Dominican Republic, lingered under an
economic "form of colonialism., 66  In time, the Structural
Dependency Theory crumbled as advocates of foreign intervention
in the region supported "public economic assistance, private
investment, and trade preferences. 67  Caribbean nations also
sought greater democratization, economic liberalization, and
68
employment in its poorer areas.69
The United States responded to these changes with the
Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), designed to deter "communist
inspired revolution through a comprehensive trade and aid
policy."7  The CBI united Latin American nations like the
Dominican Republic and Costa Rica (discussed infra in Part 111-C)
into a single strategic area "that would benefit from more liberal
access to America's markets, greater economic assistance, and
more incentives for capital investment.",
71
65 Dypski, supra note 38, at 98 (defining the Structural Dependency Theory "as
visualiz[ing] the world economy in terms of a 'center-periphery' structure, with
capitalist-industrialized nations forming the center and the developing-underdeveloped
world at the periphery.").
66 Id. (quoting G. POPE ATKINs, LATIN AMERICA IN THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL
SYSTEM 348 (3d ed., Westview Press 1995)).
67 Id.; see also ROBERT H. FERRELL, AMERICAN DIPLOMACY 765-793 (3d ed. 1975)
(providing a broad historical introduction to changes in U.S. policy in the Caribbean
during the 1960s).
68 See Dypski, supra note 38, at 98.
69 See MORAN, supra note 6, at 34.
70 Dypski, supra note 38, at 100; see also Mark Baker, Privatization in the
Developing World: Panacea for the Economic Ills of the Third World or Prescription
Overused?, 18 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 233, 247 (1999) ("Bilateral trade
agreements like the Caribbean Basin Initiative, which served to spur foreign assembly
plants in the Caribbean to take advantage of low labor costs, gave the development of
export-assembly industries some momentum.").
71 Dypski, supra note 38, at 100 (quoting MICHAEL J. KRYZANEK, U.S.-LATIN
AMERICAN RELATIONS 80 (2d ed. 1990)); see also Andrew Bittens, Trade Conditionality
and the Crane Bill: Rewarding Caribbean Basin Nations for Human Rights Failures, 6
CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 159, 159 n.5 (1998) (noting that member nations of the
CBI include Anguilla, Antigua, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bermuda, the British
Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, Costa Rica, Dominica, the Dominican Republic, El
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The first phase of the CBI, called the Caribbean Basin
Economic Recovery Act (CBERA), was signed into law by
President Reagan in 1983,72 giving Caribbean exports preferential
treatment in the United States.73 Section 212(C) of the initiative
identified, inter alia, certain minimum conditions that CBI nations
should follow in order to qualify for the programs, including
economic conditions, living standards, and other relevant
economic factors of the country.74 President Bush signed the
second phase of the CBI into law in 1990.7' Named the
"Expansion Act," it "provides greater coverage of Caribbean
articles eligible for duty-free treatment and places more pressures
upon the CBI states to ensure worker's rights and provides tax
incentives for foreign direct investment from the United States
into the area., 76  The inception of NAFTA in 1994, however,
abated many of the CBI's advantages. To offset the unintentional
advantages Mexico received as a result of NAFTA over Caribbean
basin nations,77 and "to instill confidence in the Caribbean
leadership of the dedication of the United States to free trade and
greater investment in the CBI members," a final phase of CBI was
enacted.78 On May 18, 2000, President Clinton signed into law the
Trade and Development Act of 2000.79
Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Montserrat, the
Netherlands Antilles, Nicaragua, Panama, Saint Christopher-Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint
Vincent and the Grenadines, Surinam, Trinidad and Tobago, and the Turks and Caicos
Islands).
72 Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 98-67, 97 Stat. 384
(codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2706, 16 U.S.C. § 7652 (Supp. 1983)) [hereinafter
CBERA].
73 Bittens, supra note 71, at 159 (noting that "[diesignation as a beneficiary country
had the effect of granting duty-free treatment to nearly all articles grown, produced or
manufactured in the beneficiary country" with certain exceptions).
74 CBERA, supra note 72, at 19 U.S.C. § 2702(c)(2); see also Dypski, supra note
38, at 104.
75 Customs and Trade Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-382, 104 Stat. 629 (1990)
(codified in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.).
76 Dypski, supra note 38, at 108.
77 See Hale E. Sheppard, Partial Revocation of the Caribbean Basin Trade
Partnership Act: An Analysis of Hemispheric Injuries and Domestic Benefits, 28 N.C. J.
INT'L L. & COM. REG. 135, 136 (2002).
78 Dypski, supra note 38, at 111-12.
79 Trade and Development Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-200, 114 Stat. 251 (2000)
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Since its inception, the Dominican Republic, as one of the
larger and more diversified Caribbean basin states, has been a
major beneficiary of the CBI program.8" American corporations
have invested largely in Dominican EPZs.8' United States FDI has
concentrated in manufacturing, specifically in "export processing
zones where footwear, apparel, and to a lesser extent, electronic
products and medical goods are assembled from U.S. components
and materials and then exported back to the United States." 2 As a
result, Dominican manufacturing sectors in the 1990s grew at a
sharp rate. In fact, during that time, the clothing industry in the
Dominican Republic accounted for almost 50% of all national
exports to the United States, in contrast to 10% in 1980.3 In 2000,
the Dominican Republic received a total of $1.338 billion in FDI
from 481 firms, "more than 25% of the Caribbean region's
total," 4 while 196,924 jobs were created. 5  Also, per capita
income in the island nation rose from $4,358 in 1980, one of the
lowest in the hemisphere, to $6,217 in 2000.86
It was the country's unskilled labor pool that was the key to
this development, with 85% of the starting labor force in
Dominican EPZs coming from this source. 7 Nonetheless, much
of the FDI directed at the Dominican Republic landed in Santo
Domingo, the capital, where U.S. investors had access to "more
skilled or more easily trained labor," rather than settling for the
cheapest sources of labor to manufacture the more sophisticated
products.8 Moreover, on-the-job training and learning-by-doing
(codified in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.); see also Dypski, supra note 38, at 108.
80 Dypski, supra note 38, at 117 (explaining that 19 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(1) included
the states of the Caribbean in a NAFTA-like arrangement of free trade and tariff
treatment).
81 Id. at 116.
82 Id. at 122.
83 Dypski, supra note 38, at 116 (indicating that other export intensive products
include "cigars, raw sugar, circuit parts, electronic transformers, and beer made from
malt.").
84 Dypski, supra note 38, at 121 (revealing that U.S. FDI in the Dominican
Republic reached $535 million).
85 MORAN, supra note 6, at 37.
86 BHALLA, supra note 63, at 221.
87 MORAN, supra note 6, at 36.
88 Id. at 34 ("Despite the added cost, survey data indicate that the foreign firms
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programs offered by some U.S. firms to unskilled workers has
resulted in a 44% productivity increase in the second year of
operations"9 and, more importantly, a permanent pool of skilled
labor. Yet, doubt about worker retention in many EPZs has
reduced the incentive of U.S. corporations to train their
employees, "leading to under-investment in human resource
development."9
The Dominican EPZs have indeed not been without
controversy. The Dominican Republic's remarkable growth from
the liberal infusion of FDI in the 1990s has been unable to veil a
"history of tyrannical dictatorship, pandemic corruption,... labor
and social unrest, a history of expropriation and insufficient
compensation, and weak adherence to dispute settlement
mechanisms."'"
C. Costa Rica
In contrast to the Dominican Republic, Costa Rica
demonstrates a Latin American nation's inventive efforts to
encourage FDI through government participation. "A dedication
to attracting high quality FDI, an active promotion program (The
Costa Rican Coalition for Development Initiatives), a highly-
educated workforce, and economic/political stability make Costa
Rica one of the most attractive beneficiaries of CBI treatment., 92
The attractiveness of Costa Rica is due to three investor-
friendly characteristics. First, "Costa Rican law treats foreigners
and nationals identically because the country's constitution
were willing to pay the premium rents because the better working environment served
their 'production needs' or better reflected their 'corporate image."').
89 Id. at 36.
90 Id. at 37.
91 Dypski, supra note 38, at 122; see also Jose De Cordoba, With a Banker Facing
Charges, a Nation Questions Its Success, WALL ST. J., June 30, 2003, at Al (reporting
that Ramon Baez, President of the Dominican Baninter bank, was arrested on charges of
fraud, money laundering and tax evasion. The scandal has tarred dozens of leading
figures from all sectors of Dominican national life - from past and current Presidents, to
leading journalists and justices of the Supreme Court - many of whom allegedly
received lavish gifts or regular payments from the bank); A Spectacular Fall from
Grace- The Dominican Republic's Fall From Grace, ECONOMIST, Dec. 13, 2003, at 52.
92 Dypski, supra note 38, at 121.
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prohibits discrimination against foreigners." 93 "Foreign investors
enjoy the same rights as nationals to form and operate any bona-
fide business in Costa Rica."94 Second, as a signatory member of
the CBI, Costa Rica receives duty-free treatment for
approximately 4,000 products, "helping Costa Rica diversify its
exports and increase bilateral trade with the U.S." 95 Also, while
FDI did not reach the levels achieved during 1998-1999, resulting
from the major investment by Intel, Costa Rica still received $457
million in FDI in 2001,96 making it one of Latin America's most
rapidly developing countries.9 7  Except for state-controlled
monopolies in certain sectors, no major "barriers exist in regards
to FDI in Costa Rica."9 8 Third, Costa Rica has "eliminated import
taxes on computer-related equipment, adopted an aggressive
policy upgrading information technology facilities in schools, and
strengthened its intellectual property laws."9 9 It has also
successfully assembled an incentive package that included an
eight-year income tax exemption, with a subsequent four-year
period of 50% reduction in the country's 30% income tax rate,
duty free import of raw materials, and free movement of
capital[, all] in order to land a $300 million semiconductor test
and assembly plant established by Intel outside the Costa Rican
city of San Jose.' 00
The Intel plant has become a well-documented example of
93 Alejandro Ferrate, Foreign Direct Investment in Costa Rica After the "Death " of
CBI, 2 J. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 119, 137 (1996).
94 Id.
95 Dypski, supra note 38, at 120.
96 U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, 2001 COUNTRY REPORTS ON ECONOMIC POLICY AND TRADE
PRACTICES, at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/8200.pdf (Feb. 2002).
97 Dypski, supra note 38, at 120-21. ("While entrenched U.S. investors such as
Dole and Chiquita remain in Costa Rica, newer investments taking advantage of CBI
have included manufacture or assembly of electronic components, telecommunications
equipment, machinery, consumer goods, electrical appliances, up scale apparel products,
toys, sporting goods, selected leather products and health and natural, resource-based
products, including food processing and agro-industrial products.").
98 Id.; see also Ferrate, supra note 93, at 138 (explaining that the state holds
monopolies on insurance, checking accounts, hydrocarbon and mineral extraction,
refining, and the operation of seaports and airports).
99 Len Cao, Corporate and Product Identity in the Post-national Economy:
Rethinking U.S. Trade Laws, 90 CAL. L. REv. 401, 440 n. 160 (2002).
100 Id. at 439 n.159.
[Vol. 29
THE DEVELOPMENT DILEMMA
Costa Rica's efforts to attract and maintain high-caliber FDI. Intel
announced in 1996 its decision to locate the company's new
facility in Costa Rica and employ 3,500 workers to produce its
processors, representing the largest single investment yet made by
any firm in Central America. 1 ' Within two years, Intel's FDI had
generated approximately $700 million in annual exports,
surpassing coffee and bananas, Costa Rica's two main traditional
products, combined.
10 2
In addition to Costa Rican EPZs, such as the Intel plant, Free
Trade Zones (FTZs), have become "the backbone of Costa Rica's
export and investment promotion."'1 3 Costa Rican FTZs housed
eighty-five Fortune 500 companies by the year 2000 and became
the most export-intensive economy in Latin America,""° helping to
raise employee wages in the manufacturing sector to an average of
$2.21 an hour, and $3.36 an hour at Intel."°5 Moreover, Costa
Rica's per capita income rose from an already impressive $7,399
in 1980 to $8,878 in 2000.1'6
On a training level, between 1997 and 1999, enrollment in
engineering studies at Costa Rican universities doubled,0 7
demonstrating the nation's commitment to supplying investors
with a skilled labor pool. This, along with its advantages granted
under the CBI, and its history of good-neighbor relations with the
United States, has lured FDI to Costa Rica on a grand scale. Costa
Rica remains a model example to Latin American nations wishing
to benefit from American trade policy and FDI.
IV. The Treatment of Workers
FDI is clearly imperative to the current and future economic
101 MORAN, supra note 6, at 41.
102 Id.
103 Ferrate, supra note 93, at 143-44.
104 MORAN, supra note 6, at 42; see also Ferrate, supra note 93, at 143-44
(explaining that well-known U.S. companies investing in Costa Rica include Avon,
Conair, GTE Corporation, Gerber, Levi Strauss & Company, Pfizer, and the Van Heusen
Company).
105 MORAN, supra note 6, at 41.
106 BHALLA, supra note 63, at 221.
107 MORAN, supra note 6, at 41 ("By 2000, 847 students were enrolled in the
engineering program at the Institute for Technology.").
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development of Latin American nations. Employment generated
from EPZs and maquiladoras has surely given laborers wage-
earning opportunities they otherwise would not have.
Nevertheless, working conditions in these plants for both skilled
and unskilled laborers should not be overlooked. Indeed, nations,
organizations, and the workers themselves have set minimum
standards of work conditions in EPZs and maquiladoras. The
enforcement of these standards, though, has become a common
and controversial issue for both the investor and the laborer.
Interestingly, economists and social activists have referred to
substandard working conditions and low wages of manual laborers
in the developing countries as a "race to the bottom."' 8 That is, to
minimize labor costs and attract FDI, firms have sacrificed their
workers' health, dignity, and ability to earn a living wage.'0 9
A. Standards
Labor rights opponents argue that labor standards are
encouraged merely to act as "disguised protectionism, aimed at
keeping [developing nations'] goods out of major markets." ' 10
They further argue that labor standards are a nation's own
concern, that internal decisions should dictate labor policy free of
foreign pressures."' If labor rights are to be universally
recognized and enforced, however, international bodies with
extraterritorial reach must play a significant role in setting these
norms. 112
1. International "Core" Labor Standards
The United Nations has sponsored three multilateral
instruments that treat human rights matters as well as economic
and social issues." 3 They are the Universal Declaration of Human
108 See The Rights of Workers: A 'Race to the Bottom'?, at
http://www.business.uconn.edu/redirect/CIBER/sitefiles/resourceguides/vol3/3-3.3.pdf
(last visited Nov. 2, 2003).
109 Id.
110 Erickson & Mitchell, supra note 47, at 42.
111 See id. at 42-43.
112 See Lance Compa, The Multilateral Agreement on Investment and International
Labor Rights: A Failed Connection, 31 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 683, 697 (1998).
113 Id. at 695.
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Rights," 4 the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights," 5 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social,
and Cultural Rights." 1
6
Originally, however, the notion of setting labor standards
began with the ILO." 7 Conceived after World War I, the ILO was
an appropriate forum where "labor unions, management, and
government could develop mutually beneficial solutions to their
problems.""'  Currently, the ILO, as an international body,
"undertakes research, offers technical assistance, and provides a
channel for intergovernmental programs aimed at elevating labor
standards."' '
The ILO's 1998 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and
Rights at Work is a competent attempt to establish a
comprehensive list of core labor standards, listing its fundamental
principles as: (1) the elimination of discrimination in respect of
employment and occupation; (2) the elimination of all forms of
forced compulsory labor; (3) the effective abolition of child labor;
and (4) freedom of association and the effective recognition of the
right to collective bargaining. 2 ° Under ILO law, whether or not a
114 G.A. Res. 217 (II)(A), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., Pt.1, at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810
(1948) (establishing that "everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which
the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized.").
115 G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc.
A/6316 (1966).
116 Id. at49.
117 MORAN, supra note 6, at 47.
118 Erickson & Mitchell, supra note 47, at 47; see also Declaration Concerning the
Aims and Purposes of the International Labour Organization, art. I, 15 U.N.T.S. 35, ILO
(Oct. 9, 1946) (announcing that "labor is not a commodity."). The Declaration
proclaims:
Believing that experience has fully demonstrated the truth of the statement in
the Constitution of the International Labour Organization that lasting peace can
be established only if it is based on social justice, the Conference affirms that all
national and international policies and measures, in particular those of an
economic and financial character, should be judged in this light and accepted
only in so far as they may be held to promote and not to hinder the achievement
of this fundamental objective.
Id.
119 Erickson & Mitchell, supra note 47, at 50.
120 Id. at 47; see also ILO, YOUR VOICE AT WORK: GLOBAL REPORT UNDER THE
FOLLOW-UP TO THE ILO DECLARATION ON FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND RIGHTS AT
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nation has ratified the particular convention, every member nation
is bound to abide by these principles and constitutional norms.1
21
Aside from the four fundamental principles endorsed by the
ILO, a myriad of additional standards are often recommended as
minimum requirements for the treatment of workers. 12 2 Proposed
standards usually encompass health and safety conditions and a
minimum wage. These matters, however, are usually not included
in the list of enforceable international core standards because the
variations of norms among different nations, especially in Latin
America, make it extremely difficult to establish uniform
standards. 1
23
2. The North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation
The North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation
(NAALC), the side labor agreement to NAFTA, contains eleven
labor standards to which each member must adhere. 124  These
include: (1) freedom of association and the right to organize; (2)
the right to bargain collectively; (3) the right to strike; (4)
prohibition of forced labor; (5) labor protections for children and
young persons; (6) minimum employment standards (like
minimum wages); (7) elimination of employment discrimination;
(8) equal pay for equal work (male and female); (9) prevention of
occupational injuries and illness; (10) compensation for such
injuries or illness; and (11) the protection of migrant workers.2 5
Significantly, the NAALC leaves these issues to be dealt with in
accordance with the members' respective domestic policies, as it
does not "establish common minimum standards for their domestic
WORK, http://www.ilo.org/voice@work (2000).
121 Compa, supra note 112, at 695.
122 MORAN, supra note 6, at 51; see also Blackett, supra note 16, at 26-27
(explaining that there has been a terminological shift from standards to rights in order to
give prioritization to rights and to achieve a level of uniformity in standard setting).
123 MORAN, supra note 6, at 51.
124 Karla Shantel Jackson, Is Anything Ever Free? NAFTA's Effect on Organizing
Drives and Minorities and the Potential of FTAA Having a Similar Effect, 4 SCHOLAR
307, 323 (2002) (explaining the fact that NAFTA itself did not initially contain labor
provisions indicates efforts by labor rights proponents to append the agreement to reflect
the importance of such standards).
125 North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, Sept. 14, 1993, 32 I.L.M.
1499, 1515 [hereinafter NAALC].
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law." 126  Thus, Mexican law lays the standards by which labor
rights are addressed in that nation.
Mexico's labor laws are among the world's most
comprehensive. 127 The Mexican Constitution of 1917 provides in
article 123 that "[e]very person is entitled to suitable work that is
socially useful and proceeds to establish specifications for
'suitable' work."'128 It also provides that "[b]oth employers and
workers shall have the right to organize for the defense of their
respective interests, by forming unions, professional associations,
etc. 129
Recent Mexican law also confirms the Constitution's
commitment to the rights of workers. The 1970 Federal Labor
Law expands protections by "regulating labor contracts, minimum
wages and hours, year-end bonuses and profit sharing, workers'
and employers' rights and obligations, employment of women and
minors, and collective labor relation and strike procedures."'
' 30
126 Id.
127 Isa, supra note 56, at 186-87 (explaining that "under Mexico's federal labor
laws, there shall not be established distinctions among workers for motives of race, sex,
age, religious creed, political doctrine or social condition, so that employers cannot
refuse to accept a worker for reason of age or sex.").
128 Deborah Greitzer, Thirteenth Annual National Labor Law Writing Competition:
Cross-Border Responses to Labor Repressions in North America, 1995 DET. C.L. REV.
917, 919 (1995) (quoting Constitution Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos
[CONST], Art. 123 (Mex.), translated in ALBERT P. BLAUSTEIN & GISBERT H. FLANZ,
CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 97 (1982)).
The Mexican Constitution submits the following as 'suitable' working
conditions: eight hours maximum work per day (§ (A)(I)); seven hours if during
night hours (§ (A)(II)); prohibition of labor by children under 14 (§ (A)(I1));
limitation of working hours of children between ages 14 and 16 (§ (A)(111));
maximum work week of six days (§ (A)(IV)); protection of women from
excessive work during pregnancy, including six weeks leave prior to birth, six
weeks after with full pay, and extra rest periods to allow for nursing (§ (A)(V));
equal pay for equal work (§ (A)(VII)); minimum wages (§ (A)(VI)); double pay
for overtime an limits on length of overtime (§ (A)(XI)); protection against
work injuries and against hazardous or unhygienic working conditions (§
(A)(XV)).
Id.
129 Id. at 919-20 (explaining that the Mexican Constitution further includes
provisions relating to lockouts, strikes, penalties to employers for dismissal without
cause, and social security benefits).
130 Id. at 920 (citing Ley Federal del Trabajo [Federal Labor Law (L.F.T.)], D.O.,
translated in COMMERCIAL LAWS OF THE WORLD: MEXICO LABOR LAWS (Foreign Tax
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Moreover, Mexican law "requires certain employers to offer
profit sharing to workers, while the other two NAFTA countries
do not.""13 Mexico also employs relatively advanced health and
safety laws, as well as health and safety inspectors to monitor
workplace conditions.3
2
As a signatory member of seventy-four ILO conventions,
including Convention 87, "Freedom of Association and Protection
of the Right to Organize," Mexico has availed itself of the ILO's
laws and protections, granting Mexican maquiladora workers
remedies for labor violations on an international level.'33 The law
of Mexico seemingly reflects a "commitment of the country to the
rights of its labor force,"' 34 however, the legislative intent
underlying these laws was not a desire to benefit workers.'
3. The Caribbean Basin Initiative
The CBI of 1983 encompasses standards 136 that, in order to
qualify for its preferential duty treatment, each member nation
must take steps to grant internationally recognized workers'
rights.'37 These rights include "the right of association, the ability
to organize and bargain collectively, a prohibition against any
form of forced labor, a minimum age for employment of children,
and acceptable conditions in terms of wages, hours, and
occupational safety and health."'38
Law Publishers 1995).
131 Erickson & Mitchell, supra note 47, at 57-58.
132 Workers, Profits, and Trade, supra note 1, at 52.
133 Greitzer, supra note 128, at 920 (noting that Mexico's ratification of ILO
Convention 87, which was ratified by the ILO in 1948, was published in the Diario
Oficial de la Nacion on October 16, 1950).
134 Id.
135 Id. (pointing out that "[t]he Mexican legal system recognizes the absolute right
of ownership of industry and commerce as the basis of Mexican society, accepting that
those who control capital must necessarily be driven by the goal of profit, 'otherwise
they would be doomed to stagnation and failure."').
136 See Erickson & Mitchell, supra note 47, at 50.
137 Sheppard, supra note 77, at 151.
138 Id. at 139, 151 (explaining that other standards include that member nations: (1)
cannot be communist; (2) may not take measures that have the effect of nationalizing,
expropriating, or seizing property owned by U.S. citizens or companies without prompt
and adequate compensation; (3) must act in good faith in recognizing and enforcing
arbitral awards in favor of U.S. citizens or companies; and (4) must provide effective
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Moreover, an amendment to the CBERA of 1990 expanded the
workers' rights clause to comport with the Generalized System of
Preferences (GSP). 139  These provisions, though, offer little
guidance as to what constitutes progress in guaranteeing labor
rights. 4° None of the provisions in the CBI define "reasonable
workplace conditions" or the "right to organize or bargain
collectively."'41  The CBI's "substantive failure to define labor
standards allow those responsible for granting beneficiary status to
lose their accountability in the designation process."' 42 "The result
is that standards in effect become mutable, allowing changing
domestic conditions, and not foreign labor conditions, to be as
important in determining whether to grant beneficiary status to an
eligible country." '143
The Dominican Republic is also a signatory to ILO
conventions.' Like Costa Rica, a fundamental principle of the
Labor Code of the Dominican Republic is that labor law is to
apply equally to nationals and foreigners.'45
Still applicable today, the Labor Code of 1952 forms the labor
law of the Dominican Republic.'46 Pursuant to the Labor Code, it
is the duty of the employer to:
(1) maintain the factories,... and other places in which work is
done in the condition required by the health regulations; (2) to
freely provide for the workers the preventative medicines
demanded by the health authorities... ; (3) to observe adequate
safety standards and those measures required by law to prevent
accidents in the use of machinery, instruments and work
protection of intellectual property rights).
139 See 19 U.S.C. § 2461 (1996); see also, Compa, supra note 112, at 693 n.40
("The GSP program permits a developing country to export goods to the United States
on a preferential, duty free basis as long as the country meets the conditions for
eligibility in the program.").




144 Michelle E. Gordon, Haitian Forced Labor in the Dominican Republic, 15
CoMp. LAB. L.J. 206, 209 (1994).
145 Id. at 214 (noting that legally contracted Haitian "braceros" are entitled to all of
the benefits of Dominican labor law).
146 Id.
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materials; ... (8) to treat the worker with consideration,
refraining from bad treatment of him in works or deeds; (9) to
meet all the obligations that the Code imposes on them, as well
as those derived from other laws, from the labor contract, from
collective agreements and from internal regulations.1
47
Costa Rica's domestic labor law is truly attractive to foreign
investors. Though not overtly against them, traditional labor
unions represent only 2% of the private-sector workforce. 4 8 In
their place, "solidarity groups constitute the main form of labor
organization, comprising 1,800 organizations and representing
24% of the private-sector workforce."'49 Solidarity groups cannot
strike or bargain collectively, but they do offer members low-cost
housing, credit, partial control over pension funds, and other
benefits in exchange for 5% of the workers' paychecks. 5 '
4. Corporate Codes of Conduct
Recent controversies with well-known brands like Nike and
The Gap have compelled U.S. companies, especially those that
invest heavily in developing nations where their products are
made, to lay down labor standards similar to those found in the
industrialized world. Thus, companies themselves have created
corporate codes of conduct, which act as minimal labor standards
for their subsidiaries or subcontractors.51
At best, these standards "obligate foreign subsidiaries or
subcontractors to comply with international norms and domestic
laws, or risk losing their commercial relationship with the parent
company."' 52 Often, however, U.S. and foreign plant management
in Latin American countries design minimal workplace conditions,
collective bargaining, and other standards that reflect bargaining
conditions on management's own terms.
147 Id. at 214-15 (discussing that the employer must also "pay the agreed wages
effectively, completely, and in the way, time and place agreed. The payment of wages is
not to be deferred for periods longer than one month.").
148 Ferrate, supra note 93, at 141.
149 Id. ("Solidarity groups, founded on a Roman Catholic doctrine stressing
workplace harmony, benefit foreign investors by fostering a non-confrontational
relationship between employers and employees.").
150 Id.




E. Enforcement of Labor Standards
Labor standards set the foundation for the recognition of
workers' rights. Enforcement of these standards, however, is
essential to assuring the proper implementation of FDI in EPZs
and maquiladoras. Compliance requires a mechanism to enforce
these standards and an appropriate forum to settle labor-related
disputes.
1. International Enforcement
Although considered the most comprehensive system for
overseeing labor standards and international norms, the ILO's
complaint mechanisms are limited indeed.' Complaints may
only be filed by trade organizations, employer organizations, or
governments, and with the exception of "core" human rights, may
only allege violations by another government if both nations have
ratified the pertinent convention.'54 Regrettably, the ILO, despite
its long reach "on economic matters, is not linked to dispute
resolution mechanisms of the world trading system."''
By contrast, the World Trade Organization (WTO) stands
alone as the flagship organization of trade standards enforcement.
The WTO was formed out of the Uruguay Rounds of the late
1980s and early 1990s as a response to the globalization of world
markets. 5 6 It "occupies a powerful and authoritative position in
adjudicating disputes and imposing penalties on its members."' 57
Subsequently, in the area of labor standards, it could play a
significant role, "acting on behalf of the common good and
overcoming the collective-action problems - cheating and free-
riding - that plague voluntary mechanisms" in place in Latin
153 See id. at 706-07.
154 Id. (explaining that every nation must report annually on its progress of ratifying
ILO conventions).
155 Blackett, supra note 16, at 34; see also Gordon, supra note 144, at 209 (pointing
out that the ILO investigated a situation in the Dominican Republic in 1983 where it
specifically found the country in violation of Convention 105, the Prohibition of
Compulsory Labor, but it did little to remedy the situation).
156 See Robert Howse, The World Trade Organization and the Protection of
Worker's Rights, 3 J. SMALL & EMERGrNG Bus. L. 131, 136 (1999).
157 MORAN, supra note 6, at 66.
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America.'58 The WTO's main role with respect to labor standards
is to use trade measures to put economic pressure on countries or
firms to comply with such standards." 9 The WTO's two principal
means of enforcing core labor standards are trade sanctions and
fines. '60
First, forcing plants with substandard labor practices to
improve their behavior by imposing trade sanctions on an entire
EPZ may unduly multiply the number of labor victims and
undermine other mechanisms that may be in place.' 6' For
example, "an EPZ-wide action against a garment subcontractor in
the La Romana zone of the Dominican Republic would cut off
exports from foreign-owned electronics plants in the same zone,
which pay higher-than-average wages and provide superior work
conditions.' 1
61
On the other hand, "when sanctions fail to induce any policy
change in the targeted country," global sales of products that are
manufactured with serious labor rights abuses may fall, affecting
the company's bottom line. 163 Rivals with plants "in compliance
with fundamental labor rights obligations will simply expand their
market shares."'"
The threat of sanctions, combined with activism by labor
groups, can operate more effectively than sanctions alone.' 65 Such
actions by an indigenous labor group led to the lifting of legal
158 Id. at 66-67.
159 Howse, supra note 156, at 147 (explaining that WTO agreements, such as the
Government Procurement Agreement, makes adherence to certain labor rights or labor
policies a condition for government contracting).
160 MORAN, supra note 6, at 67.
161 Id. at 69; see also Howse, supra note 156, at 156 (quoting KEITH E. MASKUS,
SHOULD CORE LABOR STANDARDS BE IMPOSED THROUGH INTERNATIONAL TRADE
POLICY? 19-21 (World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 1817, 1997)) ("The
impacts of trade restrictions taken by foreign countries depend on the circumstances...
such as whether the sector with weak rights is labor-intensive, whether it is the
exportable sector, and what linkages there are to the informal or residual employment
sectors.").
162 MORAN, supra note 6, at 69.
163 Howse, supra note 156, at 155 ("If the country or group of countries imposing
sanctions constitutes a major market for the products in question, then global demand
will now be met through production that complies with the standards in question.").
164 Id. at 156.
165 See id. at 159.
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restrictions on collective bargaining in the Dominican Republic.'66
Lamentably, the inherent perils connected with trade sanctions to
enforce labor standards have directed more interest in the notion of
using fines or monetary assessments to accomplish the same
objective.167
Fines instituted by the WTO against a firm for failing to
comply with international norms have the consequence of directly
affecting a firm's bottom line. The incentive to comply is
lessened, however, for multinational conglomerates whose
substantial coffers can withstand the implementation of severe
financial penalties against it. As a result, an alternative option
might be to require the national government to pay the fine, with
the host country passing on the fine to the offending firm.'68
A means seldom addressed by the WTO of enforcing core
labor standards is social labeling, where consumers express their
"moral preferences for labor rights protections."' 69  To garner
credibility, though, these labels must guarantee that legislation
has, in reality, been complied with. 7' Current WTO procedures,
however, do not provide such a guarantee because there is no way
of carrying out on-the-spot inspections reliably or
independently.' 7
In the end, the WTO's limited staff and lack of expertise in
labor affairs leave it ill-equipped to monitor labor standards.'72
Some suggest a joint ILO-WTO endeavor with the "primary role
for judging compliance and providing technical advice and
expertise left to the ILO, ' 1 3 as the WTO neither specializes in
labor, nor champions laborers' rights like the ILO. 174
166 Id.; see also Lance Compa, Labor Rights and Labor Standards in International
Trade, 25 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 165, 170 (1993).
167 MORAN, supra note 6, at 73; see also Isa, supra note 56, at 213 (stating that trade
sanctions hamper free trade and are usually a measure of last resort).
168 MORAN, supra note 6, at 75.
169 Howse, supra note 156, at 160.
170 Id. at 161.
171 See id. at 159.
172 Erickson & Mitchell, supra note 47, at 49.
173 Id.
174 See Blackett, supra note 16, at 40-41 ("New labor standards in the ILO may be
adopted by only a two-thirds vote of the membership, as opposed to a consensus vote in
the WTO.").
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Regardless of the international organization involved, "the
broader the enforcement mechanism, the more likely it is to
undermine the transition from lowest-skill to higher-skill operation
- and to offer protectionist interests in the developed world an
opportunity to turn dispute-settlement procedures to their own
ends.", 75
2. North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation
Enforcement
Under the NAALC, each member country is assigned a
National Administrative Office (NAO), an agency within each
nation's labor department that is responsible for the NAALC's
administration and management. 76  Under the NAALC rules, a
complaint may be filed by any person, trade union, non-
governmental organization (NGO) or other organization of the
country that seeks review of another country's alleged failure to
meet any of the NAALC's eleven labor principles.'
77
Moreover, article three of the NAALC "requires effective
appropriate government action to provide labor protection," while
article four permits a private right of action. 78 As a final penalty,
the panel "may suspend.., the application to the Party
complained against of NAFTA benefits in an amount no greater
than that sufficient to collect the monetary enforcement
assessment."'
179
In practice, however, injured Mexican laborers are rarely
remedied. According to NAO procedures after an initial
complaint, the opposing nation's labor law enforcement is
reviewed and a report is distributed that offers criticism in an
attempt to generate change.' 80 At most, though, the report creates
175 MORAN, supra note 6, at 67.
176 NAALC, supra note 125, § C, art. 15.
177 See Compa, supra note 112, at 704; see also NAALC, supra note 125, art. 29-
39(4)(b), Annex 39 (stating that the complainant party may make a "request for an
Arbitral Panel," which "may, where warranted, impose a monetary enforcement
assessment.").
178 Isa, supra note 56, at 191-92 (noting that NAALC's article four "does not
provide any mechanisms to enforce such a right of action.").
179 NAALC, supra note 125, art. 41.
180 See Compa, supra note 112, at 705.
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bad or embarrassing publicity that tries to compel a government or
employer to change its behavior, without enforcing its laws. 181
In effect, the NAALC's "domestic standards" policy allows
Mexico to reduce its minimum wage or cut social insurance and
job security protections free of consequence. 182 It designates no
punishment against the Mexican government when its domestic
laws and practices fall short of compliance with internationally
recognized labor standards. 
183
Additionally, "the NAALC has been ineffective in assuring
that the Mexican government allows workers to effectively
exercise their constitutional rights of free association and
collective bargaining through independent unions of their own
choosing."' 84 As a response, workers at many plants have formed
their own unions. Mexican federal judges have repeatedly upheld
the legality of these unions and their ensuing labor strikes. 185
Local labor boards, however, have consistently placed obstacles in
the unions' efforts to register and to strike against foreign-owned
maquiladoras. 186
Some unions in Mexico have filed complaints under the
NAALC, yet they have not been recognized. There is little
incentive to enforce the rights of workers under the law in Mexico,
because NAFTA's primary purpose is to create favorable
conditions for investment.
Consequently, several years after the signing of the NAALC,
there has been little assurance that Mexico will enforce its
constitution or laws guaranteeing workers their most basic labor
181 See id. at 708.
182 See id. at 689.
183 See id.; see also Erickson & Mitchell, supra note 47, at 57 (explaining that a
commonly expressed fear in drafting NAALC "was that low Mexican labor standards
would pull down those of Canada and the U.S.").
184 Jerome Levinson, Certifying International Workers Rights: A Practical
Alternative, 20 COMp. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 401, 402-03 (1999) (stating that President
Clinton "agreed to delete ... the NAALC provisions that provided for the possibility of
trade sanctions and monetary penalties for a persistent failure of a party to the NAALC
to enforce its own labor laws with respect to freedom of association, collective
bargaining, and the right to strike.").
185 Workers, Profits, and Trade, supra note 1, at 50.
186 Id.
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rights.187 Because there are few internal incentives to do so,
outside pressure from NAFTA members under the NAALC is
imperative to expose Mexico's non-enforcement and to compel
future enforcement of its labor laws.188 Unfortunately, the
Mexican government has put itself in the position to be "both
judge and party of the... conflicts."' 89
3. Caribbean Basin Initiative Enforcement
Unlike the NAALC, "the CBI does not contain procedures by
which unions or human rights groups may petition for a review of
a country's beneficiary status."'9 °  In fact, the labor rights
provisions are non-binding.' 9' The President is not required to
revoke the country's beneficiary status, but merely puts
beneficiary countries on notice that respect for workers' rights is
expected, rendering the workers' rights provision legally
meaningless.' 92
On the other hand, the Costa Rican legislature passed
legislation prohibiting any activities that hindered the formation
and operation of trade unions in the EPZs or elsewhere.193 In fact,
at their request, the ILO undertook two missions to help prepare
labor statutes that would "protect against any infringements of
trade-union rights."'94
In the Dominican Republic, however, there have been ongoing
complaints to the ILO that wages are set without formal collective
bargaining.' 95 Workers have looked to the nation's own Labor
Code, which provides sanctions to ensure that employers comply
with these obligations, for remedies.' 96
187 Levinson, supra note 184, at 403.
188 Isa, supra note 56, at 204.
189 Greitzer, supra note 128, at 921.
190 Bittens, supra note 71, at 166; see also 19 U.S.C. § 2702 (1989).
191 Bittens, supra note 71, at 166.
192 Id.
193 MORAN, supra note 6, at 42.
194 Id. (quoting ILO, YOUR VOICE AT WORK: GLOBAL REPORT UNDER THE FOLLOW-
UP TO THE ILO DECLARATION ON FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND RIGHTS AT WORK 51
(2000)).
195 Id. at 37.
196 Gordon, supra note 144, at 215.
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Under the Dominican Labor Code, a worker may appear
before the labor authorities to protest against an employer's
violations of his rights pursuant to his contract or the Code.'97 In
the event that a violation is found, the employer may be subject to
imprisonment, a fine, or both.198
"The Labor Department, under the direction of the Secretary of
State for Labor, is responsible for all matters relating to working
time, legal rest periods, and the protection of wages, unions, and
the labor contract."' 99  Also, a labor inspectorate investigates
complaints concerning the execution of labor contracts and laws
that are submitted by aggrieved employers or workers.2"0
Recent labor reforms, however, and the government's constant
failure to comply with them, led to successful strikes by some of
the strongest unions.2 ' "Troubled by the growing power of these
unions, the government took active measures to avoid compliance
with the new labor standards by increasing the recruitment of
cheap, conciliatory labor from Haiti. 20 2 Thus, new labor reforms
allowed the government to employ workers at lower wages, while
subject to few demands, if any.
Lamentably, more and more employers throughout Latin
America have deliberately provoked strikes to get rid of trade
203unions. Moreover, Dominican officials, like those of manyLatin American nations, clearly have not enforced workers' rights
197 Id.
198 Id. ("Article 86 of the Labor Code allows the employee to end his or her
contract, resign, and then proceed to charge the employer according to the law. The non-
fulfillment of any of the duties contained in Article 42 may be justification for a worker
to resign, pursuant to Article 10.").
199 Id.
200 Gordon, supra note 144, at 215.
The inspectors have the duty to watch over the correct application of the labour
laws, rules and labour contracts, and are also authorized to enter freely and
without previous notice any place in which there may be a violation of the laws
or regulations relating to work ... [and] to proceed with any examination or
investigation that they consider necessary to convince themselves that the legal
requirements are being observed. Id.
201 Id.
202 Id. (explaining that the inability of the Haitian braceros to unionize and to
develop legal empowerment encouraged the government to employ them in increasing
numbers and to disregard union demands pursuant to the new labor reforms).
203 MORAN, supra note 6, at 60.
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in the maquiladoras, further demonstrating that there are good
laws, but there are serious problems with compliance.2°
4. Enforcement at the Plant
"Depending on the country, labor law enforcement may be
weak, underfunded, or corrupt, ' '205 leaving firms themselves to
abide by internationally and nationally recognized labor standards.
Nevertheless, increased public pressure on corporations may be
the only means by which to improve the way companies treat their
workers. 2 6 Regrettably, firms may have difficulty in ensuring the
good treatment of workers at plants whose workers number in the
thousands and sometimes tens of thousands, or particularly where
labor conditions of their contractors are difficult to ascertain.20 7
In terms of earnings, legal minimum wages are often not
enforced.208 A mandatory global minimum wage for maquiladora
workers uniform throughout the developing world would
unfortunately hit the poorest countries with the lowest skilled
workers, like Mexico and the Dominican Republic, the hardest.
20 9
That is because management is usually under considerable
pressure to keep labor costs down at Latin American EPZs and to
be on the lookout for new production sites where the combination
of wage and productivity levels might be more favorable.210
Furthermore, because female employees seem to be the
preferred workers by maquiladora operators,2t 1 the relaxed
enforcement of women's labor rights continues to be a "black eye"
for foreign investors. For instance, the Women's Rights Division
of Human Rights Watch reported that women workers in
maquiladoras, such as the General Motors plant in Mexico, "are
given pregnancy exams as a condition of being hired, are tested
regularly for pregnancy throughout their employment, and that
204 See Workers, Profits, and Trade, supra note 1, at 52.
205 Compa, supra note 112, at 702.
206 Isa, supra note 56, at 215.
207 MoRAN, supra note 6, at 72.
208 Id. at 52.
209 Id. (contending that a universal minimum wage would deprive developing
countries of the opportunity to use their cheap labor to penetrate external markets).
210 Id. at 53.
211 Peters, supra note 3, at 228.
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pregnant workers are fired. ' '212  While these actions are illegal
under both Mexican law and ILO standards, the Mexican
government has not taken any action to enforce its laws in this and
many other instances because of the negative repercussions it
would create in its FDI by adopting a policy of strict
enforcement.
13
American consumers testify that, ultimately, they would be
willing to spend one to five dollars more for a twenty-dollar item
manufactured under good working conditions. 214  Accordingly,
enforcement of good working conditions and fair wages for
laborers in maquiladoras and EPZs is an investment, usually in
"creating a reputation for socially responsible behavior on a range
of race, gender, and labor issues.' 215 Maquiladora operators
should take heed of these consumer demands.
V. Summary of Benefits and Burdens of the Maquiladora
Enclave
Latin American nations have certainly benefited from U.S.
investment in maquiladora labor. Arguably though, the benefits to
U.S. investors have far outweighed those of Latin American
laborers. Eventually, the future of FDI into Latin America and a
healthy long-term relationship with its neighbor to the north
depends on an equal balance between seeking economic
advantages and meeting satisfactory conditions for laborers.
A. Applying Economic Theory
Once countries engage in international trade and investment,
their economies are significantly linked.216  The ensuing
competition among nations leads to policy changes that can garner
a comparative advantage in trade, but that can also be very
212 Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Social Responsibility in an Era of
Globalization, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 705, 740 n. 117 (2002) (quoting No Guarantees:
Sex Discrimination in Mexico's Maquiladora Sector, 8 HuM. RTS. WATCH, Report No.
6(B), Aug. 1996).
213 Id.
214 MORAN, supra note 6, at 57 (quoting KIMBERLY A. ELLIOTr & RICHARD B.
FREEMAN, NAT'L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, White Hats or Don Quixotes? Human
Rights Vigilantes in the Global Economy (2001)).
215 Id. at 56.
216 Erickson & Mitchell, supra note 47, at 43.
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detrimental to laborers' rights. In essence, violating workers'
rights should not be a means of gaining a comparative advantage
in trade and investment.1 7
Developing countries often protect sectors in which they are
likely to have a comparative advantage, such as in the cases of
most Latin American countries, in sectors with a high share of
unskilled workers.2"8 For Mexico and the Dominican Republic,
the pattern of protection is skewed toward export-intensive,
maquiladora sectors.219 Although Mexico's and the Dominican
Republic's comparative advantage in labor is a key reason that
maquiladoras are located there, the notion that maquiladoras will
leave if labor laws are enforced is dubious. 22' Non-labor costs of
business make labor a less-determinative factor in where a plant is
located.221
As a result, Mexico has a significant trade advantage with the
easier and cheaper transportation between Mexico and the United
States versus that between the Dominican Republic, Costa Rica or
other Latin American nations to the United States.2 22 "That quick
turnaround helps Mexico compete in products that require
customization.
' 223
International policy also has a profound impact on a nation's
comparative advantage over others. For example, after the
implementation of the third phase of the CBI in 2000, foreign
investment arrangements began to relocate to the Caribbean,
leading to greater economic diversification in the region.224 Goods
217 See Compa, supra note 112, at 692 ("Nations should not gain a competitive
advantage in global trade by killing union organizers, banning strikes, using forced
labor.., or otherwise violating workers' rights.").
218 Hanson & Harrison, supra note 45, at 280.
219 Id.
220 Isa, supra note 56, at 200 ("For example, the automobile industry is labor
intensive and needs large numbers of workers, but other expenditures for capital and
infrastructure development are also essential.").
221 Id.
222 Sheppard, supra note 77, at 148; see also Gray & Jarosz, supra note 27, at 10
(explaining that "location advantages help explain why a firm chooses state A over state
B as the site for a new factory.").
223 Joel Millman & David Luhnow, A Decade After NAFTA, Prospects for Mexico
Seem to Be Dimming, WALL ST. J., Apr. 21, 2003, at A2.
224 Sheppard, supra note 77, at 160.
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in which the Dominican Republic and other Caribbean basin
nations have a comparative advantage gained favor with U.S.
markets.225
Under the theory of comparative advantage, technology is
assumed to be the same everywhere and equally accessible to all
nations, although realistically "available technology may not be
the same in all geographic areas.... "226 In this sense, Costa Rica
has stepped ahead of its Latin American competitors by tailoring
its economic and social policy to reflect a growing emphasis on
technology training. This, along with its proximity to the United
States, has put the nation in a strong position to receive future FDI
in high-skilled areas. "One of the basic political characteristics of
the 'law' of comparative advantage is that ... it concerns itself
solely with increasing wealth... and ignores any question about
the distribution of that wealth. ' 27 Fundamentally, it is a political
strategy indicating a preference for minimal government.2
Here, "particular attention should be paid to the ways that
international policies affect groups that have traditionally faced
discrimination."22 9 Governments seeking to lower wages argue that
compensation must be permitted to vary with productivity in order
for each nation to be able to exploit the comparative advantages of
its own economy.23 They also argue that strict enforcement of
safety and health laws in plants discourages investment and
ultimately raises the cost of running a plant.
To the contrary, respect for fundamental labor rights does not
lead to a commercial disadvantage in relation to employers who
fail to respect such fundamental rights.23' As a matter of fact,
higher labor standards increase competitiveness and
225 See id. at 161.
226 Davis & Neacsu, supra note 9, at 770.
227 See id. at 757; see also IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN, THE CAPITALIST WORLD
ECONOMY 285 (1979) (noting that comparative advantage is merely a political theory,
not a scientific or economic one).
228 Davis & Neacsu, supra note 3, at 758.
229 Blackett, supra note 16, at 23 ("For example, gender inequalities may affect
macroeconomic and trade policy outcomes."). This is especially important as women
outnumber men in low-wage positions at maquiladoras and EPZs. Id.
230 MORAN, supra note 6, at 54.
231 See Howse, supra note 156, at 160.
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productivity.232 On the other hand, high accident rates stem from
"a lack of training for the workers, and intense pressure for higher
production." '233 This evidence is a strong indication that "any
comparative advantage gained" from constraining labor rights
"ought to be rejected., 234
B. The Future of Investment in Latin America
FDI is a dominant element of the world economy.235 It is
"clearly necessary for the overall economic development of the
Caribbean Basin nations" and particularly for achieving the stated
purposes of agreements like NAFTA and the CBI.236 Currently
though, many obstacles prevent all parties involved from
benefiting from FDI.
For instance, the terrorist events in the United States on
September 11, 2001, have proven detrimental to the economies of
Latin America.23' The subsequent slowdown of the U.S. economy
and military operations in the Middle East has led many American
firms to halt investment in overseas plants.
In 2002, FDI in Latin America and the Caribbean fell by 33%,
the third straight annual drop, and a further slide is expected this
year.238 The Mexican maquiladora industry continues to struggle
after eliminating half-a-million jobs in 2002.239 The Caribbean
economies have seen drastic drops in FDI revenue due to risk
aversion.240  As FDI in the region declines at an alarming
232 Blackett, supra note 16, at 49.
233 Workers, Profits, and Trade, supra note 1, at 52.
234 Blackett, supra note 16, at 17.
235 Cristina Baez et al., Multinational Enterprises and Human Rights, 8 U. MIAMI
INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 183, 194 (2000).
236 Dypski, supra note 38, at 115; see also U.S. Gov'T PRINTING OFFICE, THE
CARIBBEAN BASIN: ECONOMIC AND SECURITY ISSUES, S. Print No. 102-110, at 332 (1993)
(quoting President Reagan in a February 1982 speech before the Organization of
American States on the importance of foreign trade to Latin America).
237 Sheppard, supra note 40, at 37.
238 Foreign Investment in Latin America Drops 33%, WALL ST. J., Apr. 9, 2003, at
A10; see also, Sheppard, supra note 40, at 71 (reporting that FDI in the area totaled
$56.7 billion in 2002, down from $84 billion a year earlier).
239 Sheppard, supra note 77, at 166.
240 Id. at 167.
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rate,24"'Latin America has found itself suddenly ignored.242
The exposure of Latin America to competition from China and
other countries that have abundant unskilled labor also appears to
have contributed to a decrease in FDI .243 In 2002, China received
a record $52 billion in FDI, up 56.7% from the previous year.244
Marketwise, Latin American maquiladoras are losing garment
assembly and other low-tech work to Asia.2 45  In fact, Mexico
itself "has nearly lost the battle on low-skilled, labor-intensive
industries. 246
The Costa Rican example illustrates how important highly
proactive investment-promotion strategies are in the attraction of
sophisticated international investments.2 47 Technological advances
have undoubtedly played an integral role in triggering investment
into its high tech ready facilities and labor pools. 248 The declining
use of skilled labor, however, is shifting investment to sectors with
lower-cost labor, migrating abroad to the Asian labor pool.
249
Faced with this precarious situation, Latin American
governments have taken significant measures to attract American
investment. 25" The Mexican government recently paid a "U.S.
company $16 million to avoid an extended legal battle to establish
a hazardous waste treatment plant to avoid scaring away other
international investors from landing in Mexico.' '25'
241 Id.
242 Sheppard, supra note 40, at 71.
243 Hanson & Harrison, supra note 45, at 287.
244 Owen Brown, Foreign Investment in China Surges 56.7%, WALL ST. J., Apr. 15,
2003, at A13.
245 See Millman & Luhnow, supra note 223.
246 Id.
247 MORAN, supra note 6, at 38.
248 See Gordon R. Walker & Mark A. Fox, Globalization: An Analytical
Framework, 3 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 375, 387 (1996) (quoting Bijit Bora,
Economic Planning Advisory Commission, The Implications of Globalisation for
Australian Foreign Investment Policy, in GLOBALIZATION: ISSUES FOR AUSTRALIA 92
(1995)).
249 Hanson & Harrison, supra note 45, at 277.
250 Sheppard, supra note 40, at 56.
251 Id. at 46, 56 (remarking that Mexico also faces dilemmas with U.S. drug policy,
as its cartels account for over 65 percent of all the illegal drugs smuggled into the United
States).
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The economic slowdown has had the worst effect on
maquiladora workers who have lost their jobs or have had their
hours curtailed in attempts by companies to minimize costs and
avoid bankruptcy.252 In one example, the Hitachi Consumer
Products de Mexico plant recently suspended over 3,000 workers
to account for its delayed shipping.253 Many of these fired workers
already live at or below the poverty line in Mexico, causing a
"ripple effect on most city businesses and leaving the provincial,
border governments in a 'state of [economic] emergency.' 254
On the bright side, the rate of loss of maquiladora jobs is
expected to decrease for 2004.255 Also, "[t]he Bush Administration
has identified the negotiation and completion of the Free Trade
Area of the Americas (FTAA) by 2005 as one of its primary goals
on the international trade agenda., 256 The FTAA, if implemented,
will surely bring a windfall of FDI to all Latin American nations
whose skilled and unskilled labor pools thirst for roles in U.S.
industries. Recent developments in world events, however, have
pushed negotiations of the FTAA aside in favor of more pressing
issues affecting U.S. interests like terrorism and domestic
economic policy.
C. Reconciling Laborers'Rights With Foreign Direct
Investment
Labor rights are usually bargained-for conditions of FDI into
Latin America. Therefore, it is not absolutely necessary to
subjugate labor rights in order to attract and maintain FDI. Yet,
most Latin American governments give in to the wishes of U.S.
companies to lower labor standards in order to receive the vast
capital and employment opportunities that U.S. firms can offer.
This essentially gives U.S. interests the strongest position to
protect worker's rights throughout the Western Hemisphere. The
252 Id. at 60.
253 Id.
254 Sheppard, supra note 40, at 61 (quoting Mary Jordan, Mexico's El Dorado Loses
Its Luster; Border Economy Slows with U.S., WASH. POST, Sept. 20, 2001, at A30).
255 See Joel Millman, Mexico's Maquiladoras May Be Putting Together a
Comeback, WALL ST. J., July 25, 2003, at A12.
256 Sheppard, supra note 77, at 143 ("The FTAA... will be a free trade zone
encompassing the thirty-four democratic nations of the western hemisphere.").
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United States, by fulfilling a number of objectives, can and should
lead Latin America in setting and maintaining labor standards.
First, the United States can do much to improve the political
institutions of Latin America. Countries like the Dominican
Republic and Mexico, whose decades-long reign of the political
party PRI was notorious for corruption, resemble most states in
Latin America, where authoritarian governments have limited
citizens' access to markets, capital, and employment. Using Costa
Rica as an example, though, U.S. encouragement of government
development in Latin America will lead to fairer employment
practices and greater democratization, and allow for greater
individual liberties. Of course, other factors, including financial
assistance, could aid in this development, but ultimately, economic
success cannot occur in Latin America without political reform.
Second, the U.S. government should take a greater role in
protecting workers' rights in bilateral or multilateral treaties.
Laborers in many Latin America countries are regularly fired for
attempting to organize, for demanding better work conditions, or
for being pregnant. With its silence, the United States has clearly
not taken the "appropriate government action" as outlined in
article three of the NAALC, to provide for labor protections to,
inter alia, maquiladora workers. As a nation that touts its own
history of labor protections, the United States should play a
proactive role in establishing concrete minimum labor standards.
For example, rather than allowing workers' complaints to be
assessed by inexperienced, non-judicial officers in NAOs through
the NAALC, or to not be assessed at all like in the CBI,
subsequent economic agreements should call for harmonized,
binding labor laws among signatory nations. This is increasingly
important as the FTAA, along with the current negotiations for the
Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA), confirm that
Latin American nations are indeed seeking to increase FDI to
stimulate their economies and raise living standards. Yet, without
a clear, resounding push to harmonize labor standards from the
United States, which is undoubtedly the most powerful influence
at the bargaining table, workers' rights in Latin America will
continue to be subjugated to the flow of U.S. capital.
Third, U.S. organizations can be a determinative influence in
directing Latin American nations to protect workers' rights.
American labor unions, which have long championed workers'
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rights in the United States, can aid their Latin American
counterparts by publicly providing support during strikes.257
NGOs, which have been instrumental in past decades in protecting
the human rights of Latin Americans, could recognize that
violating laborers' rights falls within the scope of abuses that they
are trying to prevent.
In the end, however, it is up to the American consumer to
decide the direction that rights for workers in maquiladoras and
EPZs will take. Unfortunately, consumers seldom inquire into the
origin or assembly of widely popular products. When reports of
deplorable work conditions in Latin America surfaced in the
recent past, the public emerged with outcries of injustice. The
resulting public protests and mass boycott strategies against brand
names like Nike and The Gap have effectively dissuaded
American companies from wholly ignoring labor laws, and have
been somewhat successful in assuring that workers' fundamental
rights can and will be met.
VI. Conclusion
Franklin Delano Roosevelt said, "[t]he test of our progress is
not whether we add more to the abundance of those who have
much; it is whether we provide enough for those who have too
little." '258 For women like Carmen Vazquez, factory work in a
U.S.-owned maquiladora may provide a measure of autonomy,
status, and self-respect that is otherwise hard to obtain as a
housewife or domestic laborer.5 9
Since the maquiladora industry is indeed "constantly evolving,
increasingly complex and very controversial, '  investors and
workers alike could benefit in the long run if practices are based as
257 See Karen Fleshman, Abrazando Mexicanos: The United States Should
Recognize Mexican Workers' Contributions to Its Economy by Allowing Them to Work
Legally, 18 N.Y.L. ScH. J. HuM. RTS. 237, 262 (2002) (noting that there has been a
complete and salient turnaround in the manner in which the AFL-CIO and other unions
treat Latin Americans).
258 Ontiveros, supra note 10, at 38.
259 MORAN, supra note 6, at 15-16 ("As a result of higher female participation in the
labor force, a higher proportion of household income is directed toward basic family
such needs as health, nutrition, and education, which reduces the inter-generational
transmission of poverty.").
260 Workers, Profits, and Trade, supra note 1, at 45.
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equally on human values as they are on market values. 26 ' That
said, Latin American economies need "to function for the benefit
of ... working people, not necessarily for the benefit of foreign
investors, or certainly not exclusively for their benefit. '262  A
firm's self-interest should lead it away from a strategy of labor
suppression and toward measures designed to retain desirable
workers.263
The reality today, though, is that Latin American labor law
does not favor workers, but merely protects them as much as is
necessary to prevent those who control capital from becoming too
powerful.264 Consequently, the ultimate goal is to maintain the
supremacy of the state. 265 And the govermments of those states do
not enforce labor laws because of the false fear that their actions
will discourage FDI. Even worse, non-action by the United States
has made it clear that a failure to assure core worker rights in
international agreements carries no penalties,26 6 even though it has
had "substantial leverage" in encouraging improvements in labor
rights through international treaties.267 Instead of reinforcing a
"race to the bottom" for the sole purpose of attracting FDI,
governments should encourage a "race to the top.
268
261 See Ontiveros, supra note 10, at 31.
262 Workers, Profits, and Trade, supra note 1, at 53.
263 MORAN, supra note 6, at 25.
264 Greitzer, supra note 128, at 921.
265 Id.
266 Levinson, supra note 184, at 404.
267 See Sheppard, supra note 77, at 153-54.
268 Levinson, supra note 184, at 407.
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